After presenting itself as a mediator in 2023 through the Jeddah Platform, Saudi Arabia has increasingly come under scrutiny over its alleged support for the Sudanese army.
Intelligence reports, international news investigations and research centre analyses point to Riyadh’s alleged financing of defections by field commanders.
They also highlight diplomatic pressure to derail arms deals outside its preferred channels, as well as funding for military purchases from Turkey and Pakistan.
These developments raise questions about Saudi Arabia’s shifting role in Sudan’s war, particularly as its interests increasingly intersect with Ankara under the umbrella of the Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement.
In July 2026, Africa Intelligence published a report alleging that Saudi Arabia had provided direct financial support to secure the defection of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanders.
The commanders subsequently aligned themselves with the Sudanese army.
According to the report, Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, known as Al-Nour Al-Qubba, received approximately $2.5 million in exchange for defecting alongside several of his personnel and their equipment.
Financial support for Ali Rizgallah Al-Safna reportedly ranged between $800,000 and $2.5 million.
These payments go beyond humanitarian assistance. They point to the use of financial incentives to secure military allegiances and reshape the balance of power on the ground.
Saudi arms funding and the $1.5 billion Pakistan deal
The alleged financial support for defections is not the only indication of Riyadh’s growing involvement.
In January 2026, Reuters reported on negotiations over a $1.5 billion Pakistani arms deal for the Sudanese army, encompassing aircraft, drones and air defence systems, with Saudi Arabia reportedly brokering the deal.
However, the deal had stalled by April.
Reuters quoted Pakistani security and diplomatic sources as saying that Islamabad had suspended negotiations following Saudi objections and the withdrawal of Saudi funding.
The development came on the same day that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Jeddah.
Saudi Arabia’s involvement also extends beyond the proposed Pakistani deal.
Kenya’s The Standard newspaper reported in August 2026 that Riyadh was financing purchases of Turkish drones and Pakistani weapons for the Sudanese army.
The newspaper also reported that Pakistani Mahafiz V armoured vehicles had been spotted in Khartoum from August onwards.
This suggested that the reported arms arrangements were beginning to have a visible impact on the ground.
Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement deepens Saudi-Turkish military ties
The Standard also examined the implications of the Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan.
The agreement stipulates that an armed attack against any of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.
Sudan, the newspaper noted, represents the first potential practical test of this partnership beyond the territories of its signatories.
The arrangement also points to a deeper alignment between Riyadh and Ankara, with potential consequences for the wider regional security landscape.
These shifting relationships come against the backdrop of changing Saudi-UAE security cooperation in Yemen, another important dimension of Gulf security alignments.
The Turkish dimension adds another layer to the picture.
Italy’s Agenzia Nova reported in November 2026, citing Sudanese sources, that the Saudi-Turkish defence alliance would not oppose the establishment of a potential Turkish naval base on the Sudanese coast.
This would mark a departure from Riyadh’s previous position.
According to the report, Saudi Arabia would no longer object to such a military presence because of its evolving relationship with Ankara under the Mecca Agreement.
In other words, Saudi Arabia is not only reportedly helping finance the Sudanese army’s weapons purchases.
It may also be opening the door for its Turkish partner to establish a strategic military foothold on the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia’s shift from Sudan mediator to alleged war backer
The allegations point to a significant contradiction in Saudi Arabia’s role in Sudan.
Riyadh entered the diplomatic process as a mediator, helping bring the warring parties to the negotiating table through the Jeddah Platform.
Yet reports of its financial support for defections, involvement in arms negotiations and funding of military purchases raise serious questions about its subsequent conduct.
Its alleged role in financing military allegiances, influencing arms deals and supporting the acquisition of Turkish and Pakistani weapons risks deepening a conflict that continues to devastate Sudanese civilians.
Saudi Arabia cannot credibly present itself as a neutral mediator while allegations of financial and military support for one side remain unanswered.
Riyadh therefore faces growing moral and political questions over its role in the continuation of the war.
It cannot rely on its earlier diplomatic credentials to deflect scrutiny of its alleged involvement in reshaping the Sudanese army’s military capabilities and leadership.

